In 1964, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Since then, numerous examples from a diverse array of taxa have shown that seemingly altruistic actions towards close relatives are a common phenomenon. Although many species use kin recognition to direct altruistic behaviours preferentially towards relatives, this important aspect of social biology is less well understood theoretically. I extend Hamilton's classic work by de¢ning the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism when recognizers are permitted to make acceptance (type I) and rejection (type II) errors in the identi¢cation of social partners with respect to kinship. The e¡ect of errors in recognition on the evolution of kin-directed altruism depends on whether the population initially consists of unconditional altruists or non-altruists (i.e. alternative forms of non-recognizers). Factors a¡ecting the level of these error rates themselves, their evolution and their long-term stability are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Although various exceptions to Hamilton's (1964a,b) rule have been noted when the simplifying assumptions of the theory are violated (e.g. Charlesworth 1978; Uyenoyama & Feldman 1982; Karlin & Matessi 1983) , it remains a cornerstone of behavioural biology and social evolution (Grafen 1991; Queller 1992a,b; Frank 1998) . Consistent with the predictions of Hamilton's rule, altruistic behaviours tend to be directed towards close relatives. In some systems, individuals predominantly interact with their kin as a by-product of spatial structure, but in many other systems individuals interact with both kin and non-kin, and preferentially direct altruistic behaviours towards the former (Fletcher & Michener 1987; Hepper 1991) , using environmental and/or genetic cues to identify kin (reviewed in Sherman et al. 1997) . Despite some earlier skepticism (Grafen 1990) , the existence of kin recognition has now been demonstrated in a wide variety of taxa including mammals (e.g. Manning et al. 1992; Mateo & Johnston 2000) , birds (e.g. Komdeur & Hatchwell (1999) , and references therein), amphibians (e.g. Masters & Forester 1995; Pfennig 1999) , ¢shes (e.g. Olsen et al. 1998) , ascidians (Grosberg & Quinn 1986) , spiders (e.g. Evans 1998 Evans , 1999 , Hymenoptera (e.g. Moritz & Hillesheim 1990; Gamboa et al. 1996) and other insects (e.g. Joseph et al. 1999; Loeb et al. 2000) . Although Hamilton discussed the possible importance of kin recognition in his classic work on the evolution of altruism (Hamilton 1964a,b) , at the time he did not believe kin recognition to be as widespread as the empirical evidence now suggests (Hamilton 1987) .
It is clear from kin-selection theory that altruism should evolve more readily in those animals that can accurately identify kin and direct their altruistic acts exclusively towards them. However, most recognition systems have some degree of error, and kin recognition is no exception (Keller 1997; Sherman et al. 1997) . In kin recognition, two di¡erent types of error can occur; these errors are analogous to type I and type II errors in statistics (Reeve 1989) . In statistics, a type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is wrongly rejected, whereas a type II error occurs when the null hypothesis is wrongly accepted. In kin recognition, an acceptance error (type I error) occurs when an individual identi¢es a social partner as kin when it is nonkin, whereas a rejection error (type II error) occurs when an individual identi¢es a social partner as non-kin when it is kin. With acceptance errors, altruism is bestowed on non-relatives, whereas with rejection errors altruism is withheld from relatives.
As with type I and type II errors in statistics, there is some inherent degree of trade-o¡ in minimizing both types of errors in kin recognition. When the function constraining the relationship between acceptance-error and rejection-error rates was speci¢ed, Reeve (1989) was able to solve for the optimal balance between type I and type II errors under a variety of di¡erent social conditions. In contrast, the purpose of the model presented here is to quantify how imperfect kin recognition changes the conditions for the evolution of an altruistic behaviour. I do not assume that the error rates are at their evolutionary optima or that they are evolving to be so; rather, I treat these error rates as constants. I extend Hamilton's (1964a,b) work by outlining when a population of unconditionally non-altruistic alleles can be invaded by an (imperfect) kin-recognizing altruistic allele. In particular, I show how the two types of error rates modify Hamilton's rule. I then model an alternative situation by outlining when a population of unconditionally altruistic alleles can be invaded by an (imperfect) kin-recognizing altruistic allele. I show that the relative importance of acceptance errors versus rejection errors changes in these di¡erent situations.
(i.e. they are unconditionally non-altruistic, UNA). Individuals with the K allele perform kin-directed altruistic behaviours (i.e. they act altruistically but only towards individuals identi¢ed as kin). The altruistic action provides a ¢tness bene¢t, B, to the recipient but there is a ¢tness cost, C, incurred by the donor. Acceptance (type I) errors and rejection (type II) errors occur with probabilities and , respectively. I assume that a constant fraction, f, of social interactions occur between kin. The conditional probability that the kin of a K individual will also have genotype K is p KjK . The conditional probability that the kin of a k UNA individual will have genotype K is p Kjk UNA . The global frequency of K individuals is p.
Using these parameters, the ¢tnesses of the genotypes are given by
and
The second term in each equation is a result of interactions that occur with kin while the third term is a result of interactions with non-kin. For altruism to be favoured, K individuals should derive higher ¢tness from interacting with their kin than k UNA individuals will derive from interacting with their kin (i.e. the second term in equation (2) should be greater than the second term in equation (1)). However, K individuals will derive lower ¢tness from interacting with non-kin than will k UNA individuals (i.e. the third term in equation (2) will be less than the third term in equation (1)). Kin-directed altruism evolves through natural selection when the ¢tness of K individuals is greater than the ¢tness of k UNA individuals, i.e. W(K) 4 W(k UNA ). This condition is met when
where r is the probability of identity by descent. The probability that the kin of a K individual will also have the K allele is equal to the probability of identity by descent plus the probability of identity by chance (not descent), i.e. p KjK r (17r)p. The probability that the kin of a k UNA individual will have the K allele is equal to the probability of non-identity by chance, i.e. p Kjk UNA (17r)p. The r in equation (3) Figure 1 shows the maximum cost^bene¢t ratio for altruistic behaviour that will allow the spread of the K allele. If an individual recognizes everyone as kin and therefore always acts altruistically, then 1 and 0. Thus, the corner of the graph where 1 and 0 gives the conditions for the spread of an unconditionally altruistic allele. Note that other combinations of and can either expand or reduce the conditions under which the K allele will spread. Low values of and (i.e. more-accurate kin recognition) allow kin recognition to evolve more easily. Conversely, if kin recognition is highly inaccurate (high values of and ) then an unconditionally altruistic behaviour may be favoured over a behaviour based on kin recognition.
The extent to which a particular combination of and expands or contracts the conditions for the evolution of altruism using a kin-directed strategy relative to the unconditional strategy also depends on the fraction of social interactions that occur with kin, f (equation (3); ¢gure 1a,b). When a greater fraction of interactions occur between non-kin (i.e. lower values of f ), the cost of unconditional altruism increases and kin-directed altruism evolves more easily than unconditional altruism over a wider range of and than when f is high. However, it becomes more di¤cult for any form of altruism to invade a population of non-altruists when the fraction of interactions that occur between kin is reduced, unless there are no acceptance errors (see below).
If kin-recognizers always identify kin correctly ( 0) but always incorrectly identify non-kin as kin ( 1), then K individuals are actually unconditionally altruistic, as in the case considered by Hamilton. Under these conditions, the equation (3) The maximum cost^bene¢t ratio permitting the evolution of kin-directed altruism in a population of unconditionally non-altruistic individuals. The maximum cost depends on the accuracy of kin recognition, measured by the rates of acceptance errors, , and rejection errors, . The greater the space under the surface, the easier it is for kin recognition to evolve. This plot assumes that the kin are full-sibs so that r 0.5; (a) 70% of social interactions occur between kin, f 0.7; and (b) 30% of social interactions occur between kin, f 0.3. Equation (4) is equivalent to Hamilton's rule, r4C=B, where the average relatedness of individuals receiving acts of altruism is r fr. The average relatedness is equal to fr because a fraction f of social partners have a relatedness of r, while the remaining fraction (17f ) are completely unrelated.
If both acceptance errors and rejection errors occur (as in equation (3)), K individuals encounter non-relatives with frequency 17f and act altruistically towards them with probability , and they encounter relatives with frequency f and act altruistically towards them with probability 17. In total, K individuals act altruistically with frequency (17f ) f (17). The term f f (1 À )g= f(1 À f ) f (1 À )g therefore represents the fraction of altruistic acts that K individuals direct towards their kin. When both types of errors occur, the product (3) can be viewed from the perspective of Hamilton's rule as the average relatedness of the recipients of altruistic acts, r. When there are no acceptance errors (i.e. 0), K individuals never act altruistically towards non-relatives; their altruism is exclusively directed towards kin (i.e. 100% of a K individual's altruistic acts are directed towards their kin). In this case, the rate of rejection errors, , and the proportion of interactions that occur between kin, f, no longer a¡ect the conditions for the evolution of altruism (¢gure 1) and equation (3) reduces to r4C=B.
The frequency with which K individuals encounter kin and act altruistically towards them, f(17), a¡ects only how often kin receive altruism and not the average relatedness of the recipients of altruism. Consequently, the magnitude of the di¡erence in ¢tness between K and k UNA individuals depends on f and , but the sign of the di¡erence (i.e. the direction of evolution) does not. The case of no acceptance errors (i.e. 0) allows altruism to evolve more easily than in any other case and sets an upper bound on the cost^bene¢t ratio of altruistic behaviours (¢gure 1).
Acceptance errors (and f ) a¡ect the conditions for the evolution of altruism even when there are no rejection errors:
The term in the denominator indicates that acceptance errors always reduce the average relatedness of the recipients of altruism, making it more di¤cult for altruism to evolve.
EVOLUTION OF KIN-DIRECTED ALTRUISM AMONG ALTRUISTS
When the cost of an altruistic behaviour is less than the bene¢t weighted by the average relatedness of social partners, Hamilton's rule is satis¢ed (equation (4)) and an unconditionally altruistic gene can spread to ¢xation. We can then ask under what conditions a kin-recognition allele, K, can invade a population of unconditionally altruistic alleles, k UA . We do this by comparing the ¢tness of the K and k UA alleles when only these two alleles exist in the population. The ¢tnesses of the alleles are given by
Note that the ¢tness of the K allele depends on whether it is competing against the k UNA or the k UA allele (i.e. equation (2) and equation (8) are not the same). Because K individuals do not always identify their kin as such (rejection errors), they should derive lower ¢tness from interacting with their kin than k UA individuals will derive from interacting with their kin (i.e. the second term in equation (8) should be less than the second term in equation (7)). However, K individuals will derive higher ¢tness from interacting with non-kin than will k UA individuals because k UA individuals always act altruistically, even to non-kin (i.e. the third term in equation (8) will be greater than the third term in equation (7)). Kindirected altruism will evolve when W(K) 4 W(k UA ). This condition is met when
Note the reversal in the direction of the inequality in equation (9) relative to that in equation (3). This reversal is not surprising: higher costs of altruism make it easier for an alternative strategy to invade a population of unconditional altruists. If the cost of altruism is too high, Hamilton's rule (equation (4)) will be violated and unconditional altruists will be quickly supplanted by unconditional non-altruists. In that case, we would return to the analysis in ½ 2 for the evolution of K in a population of unconditional non-altruists. For the present case, we are most interested in intermediate levels of costs, speci¢cally (combining equations (4) and (9)).
r5C=B5fr.
( 1 0 ) This inequality identi¢es the conditions under which unconditional altruism is favoured over unconditional non-altruism but where a kin-directed altruism is superior to both. Figure 2 shows the minimum cost^bene¢t ratio for altruistic behaviour that will allow the spread of the K allele. If 0 and 1 then an individual recognizes everyone as non-kin and therefore never acts altruistically. Thus, the corner of the graph where 0 and 1 gives the conditions for the spread of an unconditionally non-altruistic allele; this corner therefore gives the maximum cost^bene¢t ratio speci¢ed by equation (10). Combinations of and that require higher minimum cost^bene¢t ratios than the value at this corner represent cases where equation (10) is violated (i.e. cases in which unconditional non-altruism would supplant unconditional altruism). Combinations of and that require a lower minimum cost^bene¢t ratio than 0 and 1 are regions where an unconditionally non-altruistic allele Kin recognition and altruism A. F. Agrawal 1101 would be unable to invade a population of unconditionally altruistic alleles but where a K allele could do so.
The term f =f1 À ((1 À f ) f (1 À ))g in equation (10) represents the fraction of non-altruistic acts that K individuals direct towards kin. When there are no rejection errors (i.e. 0), K individuals never act nonaltruistically towards kin and equation (10) no longer depends on the acceptance-error rate: 05C=B5fr.
( 1 1 )
When they make no rejection errors, K individuals receive the same bene¢t from interacting with kin as k UA individuals receive from interacting with their kin. Unlike k UA individuals, K individuals do not always pay the cost of altruism when interacting with non-kin. This case of no rejection errors allows altruism based on kin recognition to evolve in a population of unconditional altruists more easily than any other condition and sets a lower bound (i.e. zero) on the minimum cost^bene¢t ratio for altruistic behaviour.
The existence of rejection errors a¡ects the evolution of kin-directed altruism even in the absence of acceptance errors:
( 1 2 ) Rejection errors prevent K individuals from acting altruistically towards their relatives and thus reduce the bene¢t received through kin interactions below the level received by k UA individuals.
DISCUSSION
Almost 40 years ago Hamilton (1964a,b) explained how altruistic behaviours could evolve if the recipients of such actions were relatives. Since then, a growing body of empirical evidence has shown that many animals identify and respond di¡erentially to relatives. The accuracy of kin identi¢cation has been modelled for a variety of possible kin-recognition systems (e.g. Crozier & Dix 1979; Getz 1981; Lacy & Sherman 1983) . The evolutionarily optimal balance between type I and type II errors has also been calculated for various ecological scenarios (Reeve 1989) . However, the direct connection between kin recognition and the evolution of altruism has not previously been modelled. Here, I have outlined the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism in populations of unconditional altruists and unconditional non-altruists. The extent to which kin recognition relaxes the conditions for the evolution of altruism depends on the probabilities that kin and non-kin are identi¢ed correctly as well as the proportion of interactions that occur between kin. From the perspective of Hamilton's rule, these factors can be viewed as determining the average relatedness of the recipients of altruism.
Not surprisingly, the range of conditions under which kin-directed altruism evolves expands with increasing accuracy of kin recognition (i.e. decreasing error rates). Ironically, if kin recognition is too inaccurate, kinrecognizing altruists may be unable to invade a population of unconditional non-altruists even in cases where unconditional altruists would be able to do so. When the error rates are such that the K individuals recognize everyone as kin and, consequently, always act altruistically, this model recovers Hamilton's rule (equation (4)). When the error rates are not constrained in this way, their e¡ects on the conditions for the spread of the K allele depend on whether the K allele is evolving in a population of unconditional non-altruists (¢gure 1) or unconditional altruists (¢gure 2). When evolving in a population of unconditional non-altruists, the inequality depends on the fraction of altruistic acts that K individuals direct towards their kin. In contrast, when evolving in a population of unconditional altruists, the inequality depends on the fraction of non-altruistic acts that K individuals direct towards kin. In the ¢rst case acceptance errors, , play a larger role while in the second case rejection errors, , are more important.
Increasing the fraction of interactions that occur between kin, f, expands the conditions under which (either unconditional or kin-directed) altruists can invade a population of unconditional non-altruists. This e¡ect occurs because with increasing f a greater fraction of the recipients of altruism are kin. However, increasing f can reduce the parameter space in which kin-directed altruism is favoured over unconditional altruism. At high The minimum cost^bene¢t ratio permitting the evolution of kin-directed altruism in a population of unconditionally altruistic individuals. The minimum cost depends on the accuracy of kin recognition, measured by the rates of acceptance errors, , and rejection errors, . The greater the space above the surface, the easier it is for kin recognition to evolve. This plot assumes that the kin are full-sibs so that r 0:5; (a) 70% of social interactions occur between kin, f 0.7; and (b) 30% of social interactions occur between kin, f 0.3.
values of f, a K individual can su¡er more by wrongly denying altruism to kin than an unconditional altruist su¡ers by being altruistic towards non-kin.
The acceptance-error and rejection-error rates discussed in this model can be empirically estimated. The type I error rate, , can be estimated by measuring the fraction of interactions with non-kin in which a focal individual acts altruistically. Similarly, the type II error rate, , can be estimated by measuring the fraction of interactions with kin in which a focal individual acts non-altruistically. In both cases, a population average estimate could be obtained by averaging estimates for a variety of individuals from di¡erent families.
(a) Identi¢cation of kin using genetic cues Environmental and/or genetic cues could be used to assess the relatedness of a social partner (Sherman et al. 1997) . Although the analysis described in ½½ 2 and 3 applies to any type of kin recognition, I now focus on systems that rely on genetic cues. There is a growing body of evidence that, in many systems, animals have ways of assessing the genotypes of their social partners at marker loci (e.g. Manning et al. 1992; Masters & Forester 1995; Olsen et al. 1998) . The term`marker loci' is used to indicate that these loci are not directly involved with the tendency of an individual to act altruistically; they are other loci in the genome that perhaps perform unrelated functions but that can be used to assess relatedness.
There are a number of ways in which animals could evaluate genetic cues to assess relatedness (Crozier 1987; Sherman et al. 1997 ). An individual could regard a social partner as kin only if the social partner has a certain number of alleles at the marker loci in common with the focal individual. Golden hamsters appear to use such a self-referent matching system to identify kin (Mateo & Johnston 2000) . In other systems, individuals may use kin-referent templates learned in the nest to identify kin in other contexts (Sherman et al. 1997) .
When the number and frequency of alleles at each marker locus, as well as the rules of the recognition system, are known, it is possible to calculate parameters and for a given mating system. For example, assume that there are only two di-allelic marker loci, A and B, and that an individual regards a social partner as kin only if the social partner has exactly the same markerloci genotype as itself. Figure 3 shows the values of and as functions of the allele frequencies under these conditions and assuming that females mate randomly but singly, producing families of full siblings. When marker alleles become ¢xed, is minimized and is maximized. Under these conditions, all individuals have the same marker alleles so everyone recognizes everyone else as kin. As with type I and type II errors in statistics, there is some inherent degree of trade-o¡ in minimizing both and for kin recognition (compare ¢gure 3a and ¢gure 3b). This trade-o¡ between rates of acceptance errors and rejection errors occurs whenever there is some degree of overlap in the distributions of genetic cues presented by kin and non-kin (Reeve 1989) . The existence of a tradeo¡ indicates that not all combinations of and are equally likely; the exact nature of this trade-o¡ (and therefore the constraints on and ) will depend on the rules of the recognition system.
Just as increasing the sample size mitigates this tradeo¡ in statistics, so increasing the number of loci and the number of alleles per loci mitigate this trade-o¡ for kin recognition. The more loci that serve as markers and the higher the degree of polymorphism at each locus, the more accurately relatedness will be assessed (Crozier & Dix 1979; Getz 1981; Lacy & Sherman 1983) . Because more information leads to increased identi¢cation accuracy, selection should favour modi¢er alleles that cause the kin-recognition system to detect and use a greater number of polymorphic marker loci in the assessment of relatedness. An upper limit is set by the number of cues presented by a social partner. In addition, there may be costs associated with attempting to perceive a more accurate measure of a social partner's genotype. These costs could manifest as an increase in the time required to assess these additional cues or an increase in the perception or processing power required to use these additional cues.
(b) The stability of genetic cues
The existence of altruistic behaviours based on kin recognition should tend to eliminate polymorphism at marker loci, making kin recognition continually less accurate (Crozier 1987) . Positive frequency-dependent selection occurs because those individuals with common marker genotypes will commonly be mistaken for kin and thus become the recipients of altruistic acts. If we consider the kin-recognition system based on two di-allelic loci described in ½ 4(a) and assume multi-locus HardyŴ einberg equilibrium, the ¢tness di¡erence between the two alleles, A 1 and A 2 , at the ¢rst marker locus is À 0.5f (1 À 3b(1 À b))),
where a and b are the frequencies of the A 1 and B 1 alleles, respectively. When the two A alleles are equally common (i.e. a 0.5) then W(A 1 )7W(A 2 ) 0 and these marker alleles are selectively neutral. However, this situation is unstable. Assuming, as should be true, that C7B 5 0, when the A 1 allele is rare (i.e. a 5 0.5) then W(A 1 )7W(A 2 ) 5 0, leading to the elimination of this allele. When A 1 is common (i.e. a 4 0.5) then W(A 1 )7W(A 2 ) 4 0, leading to the ¢xation of the A 1 allele. An analogous situation holds for the second marker locus. Although the mathematical details of equation (13) depend on the rules of kin recognition, the number of alleles and loci involved, as well as the mating system, the principle remains the same: altruism based on kin recognition generates positive frequency-dependent selection on marker loci. This process will tend to eradicate polymorphism, making genetically based identi¢cation of kin impossible. For kin-directed altruism to persist over evolutionary time, recognition systems must depend on marker loci that are maintained at high levels of polymorphism for other reasons, such as disassortative mating and/or coevolving parasites (Crozier 1987) .
CONCLUSIONS
Imperfect kin-recognition systems modify the relatedness coe¤cient in Hamilton's rule. The relative importance of acceptance errors versus rejection errors depends on (i) whether the kin-recognizing altruist is competing against unconditional altruists or unconditional nonaltruists, and (ii) the fraction of interactions that occur between kin. E. D. Brodie III and M. J. Wade improved the presentation of these ideas. Two anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments. I thank a reviewer for pointing out the relationship between the conditional genotype probabilities and relatedness. This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
